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ABSTRACT
Structural break points in the First Division/English Premier League time series
of competitive balance identify an Early Period, a Pre-World War II Period, a
Post-War Period, and a Modern Period. The Early Period corresponds to tech-
nology diffusion (defense and tactics) along with important economic structural
imposition by leagues. The war periods are common to many time series. The
Modern Period’s sharp decline in balance corresponds to the newest version of
the Champions League in 1994/1995 and the Bosman Ruling of 1995. Rotten-
berg’s invariance principle suggests that it would be the former, rather than the
latter, responsible for the historical rate of decline that follows this structural
break.
I INTRODUCTION
Assessment of time series of competitive balance measures in sports leagues
has been done extensively for North American leagues – Lee and Fort
(2005) and Lee (2009) for Major League Baseball and Fort and Lee (2007)
for the National Basketball Association, National Football League, and
National Hockey League. However, much less work has been done on the
time series behavior of competitive balance in world football (soccer).
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), Szymanski and Smith (2002), and Groot
(2008) all incorporate simple tracking of competitive balance over time in
European football, and Palacios-Huerta (2004) analyzes break points in the
time series of football production components on the field. In this paper, we
apply what has come to be called the ‘BP method’ (Perron, 1989; Bai and
Perron, 1998, 2003) to measures of competitive balance in the Football
League First Division/English Football Association Premier League, 1888–
2007 (henceforth, the EPL).
Both competitive balance itself and the time series behavior of measures of
competitive balance are important. On the first count, under Rottenberg’s (1956)
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, competitive imbalance can be sufficient to
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drive down team attendance and, eventually, league revenues. Since leagues pur-
sue a variety of policy interventions ostensibly to improve balance, understand-
ing the behavior of measures of competitive balance can help inform all
interested in these choices by leagues.
On the second count, the time series behavior of measures of competitive
balance is important as follows. First, a common approach when data are
non-stationary after ordinary unit-root testing is the first-difference approach.
If yt is the time series, where t = 1, …, T indexes the time series length, then
the first-difference series yt+1  yt, t = 1, …, T is invariably stationary. But
this first-difference approach creates some problems for the usual economic
interpretations (e.g., there is no longer any elasticity interpretation). The BP
method uses regression analysis with a constant and a time trend to identify
break points in a time series. If breaks are detected, the technique adds a
dummy variable for the break year to estimate the significance and direction
of the break. Thus, the BP method is useful in identifying stationary subsets
of the data; in subsequent regression analysis within the subsets, there is no
need to use first-differences and give up elasticity interpretations.
Second, in their studies assessing demand for European football – rather
than just tracking competitive balance – Davies et al. (1995) and Jones et al.
(2000) show that ignoring time series behavior in sports data could lead to
spurious correlations. Identification of stationary periods in the time series is
clearly an aid to subsequent level-data analysis using cross-section and pooled
regression techniques.
Last, but not least, matching the break points to specific corresponding his-
torical occurrences can suggest fruitful lines of future inquiry. Sometimes (as
in this paper), clear tests of existing theory are suggested. On other occasions,
new theories are suggested. As the reader will see, it is a long-enough endea-
vor to generate the insights themselves. Actually carrying out the applications
of theory is beyond the scope of this (already lengthy) paper.
We find that there are statistically significant break points in the data that
help define an ‘Early Period’ (1888 to the early 1900s), a ‘Pre-War Period’
(mid-1900s to later 1930s), a ‘Post-War Period’ (mid-1940s to the mid-1990s),
and the ‘Modern Period’ (after the mid-1990s). The Early Period corresponds
to ‘technology diffusion’ involving innovations in defense and tactics (also
observed by Palacios-Huerta, 2004; Groot, 2008) as well as important eco-
nomic structural imposition by leagues (equalized admissions prices and fixed
player payments). The World War II impact is common in nearly all time ser-
ies generated during that cataclysmic event.
We associate the Modern Period with three occurrences. First, there were
alterations in the format of the Champions League in the mid-1990s that may
have led to a change in talent choice by top national teams. Second, revenue
equality grew dramatically at this time. Third, the Bosman Ruling of 1995
changed the definition of the transfer system. Rottenberg’s (1956) invariance
principle would argue that the Bosman Ruling should simply change the dis-
tribution of value created by players, but not the distribution of their playing
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talent across the EPL. We reiterate that analysis of this nature awaits further
study beyond our scope here.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we lay out the time series
approach. Estimated break points, their impacts on balance, and our charac-
terization of the episodes they define are in Section III. In Section IV, we tie
break points to historical occurrences, within the limits of the break point
technique. Conclusions round out our analysis in Section V.
II TIME SERIES APPROACH
Lee and Fort (2005) and Fort and Lee (2007) apply this BP method to North
American pro sports leagues, and we follow their approach in our application
to the EPL. In the BP method, the dependent variable is a measure of com-
petitive balance and the independent variables are a constant term and time
trend variable. We allow both the constant term and the trend term the
chance to exhibit breaks in our model that follows, compared with more
restricted versions. It also ends up that allowing both the constant and trend
the chance to exhibit break points results in higher adjusted-R2 compared with
more restricted versions.
Technically, prior to 1992, the EPL was the Football League First Division
and the Football Association English Premier League after that. Our melding
of the two does no harm since the original 20 EPL clubs formed their league
out of that First Division. The general BP model is as follows, estimated on
competitive balance measures for the EPL, 1888–2007:
yt ¼ ax0t þ bjz0t þ ut; t ¼ Tj1 þ 1; . . .;Tj; j ¼ 1; . . .;mþ 1; ð1Þ
where yt is the dependent variable at time t; xt (p 9 1) and zt (q 9 1) are vec-
tors of covariates and a and b (j = 1, …, m + 1) are the corresponding vectors
of coefficients; ut is the disturbance at time t. The break points indexed
(T1, …, Tm) are treated as unknown. For example, if one finds breaks in years
t = 3 and t = 12, then i = 1, …, 3 identifies three regimes: up to t = 3, from
t = 4 to t = 12, and after t = 12.
This is a partial structural change model since the parameter vector a is not
subject to change. In this paper, we allow both coefficients to change (p = 0
and q = 2). Therefore, this model is a pure structural change model where all
the coefficients are subject to change as follows;
yt ¼ bjz0t þ ut; t ¼ Tj1 þ 1; . . .;Tj; j ¼ 1; . . .;mþ 1: ð2Þ
Ours is clearly not a structural model since it uses time trends and break
points without independent variables to capture aggregate-level balance deter-
minants. We assume that our break points, and interactions of break points
and time trend, explain the average movement of balance. Break points
should be picking up whether structural changes really did matter in funda-
mental ways to competitive balance and we’ll offer historical occurrences asso-
ciated with the break points to fill in the details. We hasten to note that this
analysis determines only the behavior of competitive balance time series. To
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best fit the impact of balance on attendance, or to assess the causes of competi-
tive balance, other measures may prove much more enlightening (Fort and
Maxcy, 2003).
With respect to the specification of balance variables, a tried and true
approach to capturing competitive balance in the sports economics literature
is to examine the dispersion of winning percentages at the end of the regular
season. The more evenly matched the teams were during the season, the more
‘tightly bunched’ would have been the team winning percentages at the end of
the season. Lee and Fort (2005) and Fort and Lee (2007) used the well-known
Scully (1989)–Noll (1988) ‘ratio of standard deviations’ and the ‘tail likeli-
hood’ measure from Fort and Quirk (1995) as measures for tracking competi-
tive balance in North American leagues. For the EPL, a number of factors
depicted in Table 1 impact the use of these dispersion measures that have pro-
ven successful in tracking balance in North American leagues.
First, calculation of the Scully–Noll ratio based on winning percents is
appropriate in nearly all North American Leagues. However, like the
National Hockey League, calculation of the ratio for the EPL will involve a
points system for wins. Cain and Haddock (2006) derive the different formulas
for the Scully–Noll measure for winning percent, 2-points-for-a-win, and
3-points-for-a-win shown in Table 2. Fort (2007) shows that there should be
no substantial difference in regression analysis using any of the three measures
since their correlation coefficients are close to 1. For example, the 3-points-
for-a-win version has correlation coefficients about 0.994 with the other two
Scully–Noll versions in Table 2. So we lose nothing restricting ourselves to
2-points-for-a-win measure (operative for the vast majority of the years in our
time series) in subsequent regression analysis.
Similarly, the tail likelihood measure falls short beyond the binary distribu-
tion for winning percent as shown by Koning (2000). Fortunately, he provides
us with a ‘concentration ratio’ alternative also shown in Table 2. Koning’s
ratio is defined as the number of points obtained by a pre-specified number of
the top teams divided by the maximum number of points that they could have
Table 1
Complications: divisions, teams, point systems
Period Divisions Period EPL teams Period Points/win
1888–1891 1 1888–1890 12 1888–1980 2
1892–1919 2 1891 14 1981–2007 3
1920 3 1892–1897 16
1921–2007 4 1898–1904 18
1905–1918 20
1919–1986 22
1987 21
1991–1994 20
1991–1994 22
1995–2007 20
Notes: Play was precluded during the wars, 1915–1918 and 1939–1945.
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obtained. If the concentration ratio is high, the top teams did not lose many
points to weaker teams, so less competitive balance. Although the Scully–Noll
ratio represents overall dispersion of wins or points, Koning’s ratio focuses on
dispersion of wins or points for top teams. While he did not mention using
his ratio for teams at the bottom of the standings, we apply it to them as well.
A higher value of Koning’s ratio calculated for teams at the bottom implies
more balance.
As any concentration ratio is sensitive to the number of firms, Koning’s
ratio is sensitive to league size. For example, even if the competitive balance
level remains constant, the top three teams in, say, a 20-team league should
be better than the top three teams in a six-team league. However, as shown in
Table 1, the number of EPL teams only varied between 20 and 22 teams from
1905 on, so the sensitivity of Koning’s ratio to league size should not be a
problem in practice for our analysis.
Table 2 also shows the correlations between versions of Koning’s ratio cal-
culated for the top and bottom three and four teams and for both the 2-
points-for-a-win and 3-points-for-a-win historical variants. The correlation
coefficients between the 2-points-for-a-win and 3-points-for-a-win versions are
at least above 0.980 for the top teams and at least above 0.972 for the bottom
teams. As with the Scully–Noll ratio, we lose nothing in our subsequent
regression analysis by using only the 2-points-for-a-win version of Koning’s
ratio (in operation for most of the sample period). We use the ratio calculated
for three and four (top and bottom) teams for comparison purposes.
Tables 3 and 4 give descriptive statistics of our chosen competitive balance
measures for the overall sample and by decade averages, respectively. Table 4
shows that temporal variations are similar between our measures. For the ear-
liest decades, from Table 1, the number of teams increased rapidly in the
1800s (from 12 to 18) and Koning’s ratio for the upper teams is supposed to
increase by definition even if the level of competitive balance remains con-
stant. On the other hand, the ratio for the lower teams is supposed to
decrease by the same definition. However, in Table 4, the ratio for the upper
teams decreased from 0.724 to 0.670 and the ratio for the lower teams
increased from 0.370 to 0.402. This implies a dramatic improvement in com-
petitive balance for the 1890s and early 1900s.
Competitive balance improved before WWII, but the imbalance level
jumped up right after WWII, again for the 1960s, and again for the 2000s. In
Table 3
Competitive balance measures, descriptive statistics (2-point-for-a-win versions only)
RSD CR3U CR3L CR4U CR4L
Mean 1.494 0.704 0.375 0.705 0.401
Median 1.495 0.698 0.379 0.702 0.404
Std. Dev. 0.346 0.047 0.041 0.043 0.036
Maximum 2.481 0.829 0.475 0.836 0.490
Minimum 0.742 0.617 0.279 0.628 0.314
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comparison, the percentage changes associated with the decreases in balance
are largest for the Scully–Noll ratio and smallest for Koning’s ratio calculated
for the top teams. All measures show the worst balance in the current decade,
2001–2007. Pretty much across all measures, the EPL was most balanced in
the 1930s (although the teens are close for Koning’s ratio for the top teams).
Koning’s ratio for the top three or four teams should vary differently over
time from the ratio for the bottom three or four teams because the calculation
for the top and bottom teams are negatively correlated by definition (a decline
in the ratio for top teams implies an increase in the ratio of other teams).
However, the correlation is not complete as seen in Table 4 (comparing the
top and bottom three-team versions to each other, and similarly for the top
and bottom four-team versions). Later, accounting for break points, fitted val-
ues also do not behave as exact mirror images of each other. This could be
due to the fact that the top three or four teams in the EPL would be tradi-
tional powerhouses, while the bottom three or four teams would be different
season-to-season because of promotion and relegation.
III BREAK POINTS AND BALANCE IMPACTS
The foregoing observations, of course, assume there are no break points in
the data and break point analysis gives misleading results if a competitive bal-
ance time series is not stationary. Unit-root tests lay these issues to rest. The
results of augmented Dickey–Fuller and the Phillips–Perron tests for unit-root
(regressions with a constant and a time trend) are shown in Table 5. The null
hypothesis of unit-root is rejected at the 99% critical level. This result is con-
sistent with earlier results on competitive balance measures for Major League
Baseball (Lee and Fort, 2005) and other North American Leagues (Fort and
Lee, 2007).
Perron’s GAUSS code was used to estimate the break points and the results
are in Table 6. Various recommended tests all reject the null hypothesis of no
breaks at the 99% critical level for all of our measures. The first is a ‘sup
Table 4
Competitive balance measures, averages by decades (2-point-for-a-win versions only)
RSD CR3U CR3L CR4U CR4L
1888–1900 1.498 0.724 0.370 0.727 0.405
1901–1910 1.225 0.670 0.402 0.675 0.428
1911–1920 1.293 0.662 0.381 0.668 0.408
1921–1930 1.239 0.672 0.400 0.670 0.423
1931–1940 1.130 0.666 0.417 0.665 0.437
1941–1950 1.450 0.683 0.376 0.690 0.401
1951–1960 1.378 0.687 0.389 0.686 0.411
1961–1970 1.667 0.720 0.356 0.721 0.383
1971–1980 1.622 0.711 0.356 0.712 0.383
1981–1990 1.656 0.715 0.357 0.715 0.387
1991–2000 1.685 0.730 0.364 0.731 0.389
2001–2007 2.086 0.797 0.328 0.786 0.358
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Wald’ type test of no structural break (m = 0) vs. a fixed number of breaks.
We denote this ‘Sup FT(k)’ for no break vs. k breaks. The second and third
tests are double maximum tests, referred to as UDmax and WDmax. These tests
are for the null hypothesis of no structural break against an unknown number
of breaks given some upper bound M. The test of the ‘Sequential Method’
Table 6
BP approach results for the English Premier League: 1888–2007 (2-point-for-a-win versions
only)
Specifications
zt = {1, time} xt = {0} q = 2 p = 0 e = 0.1 h = 10 M = 5
Tests
Sup FT(1) Sup FT(2) Sup FT(3) Sup FT(4) Sup FT(5) UDmax WDmax
RSD 33.80* 30.84* 25.50* 33.13* 25.11* 33.80* 54.34*
CR3U 55.55* 46.77* 36.63* 28.86* 28.65* 55.56* 58.70*
CR3L 28.55* 19.79* 15.74* 12.32* 11.38* 28.55* 28.55*
CR4U 68.94* 59.00* 46.70* 48.17* 39.85* 68.94* 79.02*
CR4L 21.49* 15.84* 13.09* 11.38* 10.74* 21.49* 21.49*
Sup F(2/1) Sup F(3/2) Sup F(4/3) Sup F(5/4)
RSD 19.22* 12.81** 5.31 7.85
CR3U 27.94* 12.35 8.69 8.69
CR3L 11.84 7.26 3.23 2.01
CR4U 24.98* 14.55*** 20.30* 6.24
CR4L 10.24 7.51 4.17 5.82
Number of breaks selected, sequential method
RSD CR3U CR3L CR4U CR4L
2 2 1 2 1
Notes: e = h/T, a trimming parameter; h = minimum length of each regime; M = upper bound. 1% signifi-
cance level for the sequential test.
*Significant at the 99% critical level; **Significant at the 95% critical level; ***Significant at the 90%
critical level.
Table 5
Augmented Dickey–Fuller and Phillips–Perron unit-root tests (2-point-for-a-win versions only)
ADF (p) PP (l)
Constant Trend Constant Trend
RSD 2.296** (1) 7.217* (0) 5.866* (6) 7.318* (4)
CR3U 1.558 (2) 6.679* (0) 5.988* (7) 6.912* (6)
CR3L 7.873* (0) 9.036* (0) 8.520* (6) 9.123* (4)
CR4U 1.488 (2) 6.146* (0) 5.456* (7) 6.301* (6)
CR4L 7.616* (0) 9.240* (0) 8.307* (6) 9.281* (2)
Notes: The number of lags is determined by minimization of the Schwartz–Bayesian criterion for the
ADF test. Bandwidth is determined by Newey and West (1994) for the PP test.
*Significant at the 99% critical level; **Significant at the 95% critical level.
ADF, Augmented Dickey–Fuller test; p, the number of lags; PP, Phillips–Perron test; l, bandwidth.
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compares the null hypothesis of, say, l breaks, vs. the alternative hypothesis
of l + 1 breaks. We denote this ‘Sup FT(l + 1/l)’ for l breaks vs. l + 1 breaks.
Based on the Sequential Method at the 99% critical level, the number of
structural breaks is estimated as 2 for the standard deviation ratio, 2 for Kon-
ing’s ratio on the top teams, and 1 for Koning’s ratio on the bottom teams.
Table 7 shows estimates of break points and their confidence interval at the
99% critical level. There are a number of observations. First, as discovered in
work on North American leagues, the results in Table 7 show the value of
analyzing a variety of measures. Using just the ratio of standard deviations
would have missed the 1901 and 1906 break points. Using just Koning’s ratio
(for top and bottom teams) would have missed the 1937 break point. Second,
despite these differences, the results do exhibit some consistency; all measures
detect the last break point, 1995–1997, and Koning’s ratio (using both top
and bottom teams, for either the top three and bottom three, or top four and
bottom four) detects the 1901, 1906, and 1995/1997 breaks. Third, the confi-
dence interval of the 1937 break is wide because of the war-precluded seasons,
1939–1945. Across the two different ratio measurement approaches, it is rea-
sonable to say that break points occurred in 1901, 1906, 1937, and 1995/1997
(or both). To us, these suggest an ‘Early Period’ (1888 to the early 1900s), a
‘Pre-War Period’ (mid-1900s to later 1930s), a ‘Post-War Period’ (mid-1940s
to the mid-1990s), and the ‘Modern Period’ (after the mid-1990s).
The next step in the BP process is to use the break points to actually esti-
mate the competitive balance time series to determine the statistical signifi-
cance of the shifts associated with these breaks as well as their direction.
Table 8 shows the OLS estimation results using dummy variables based on
break estimates. Using the coefficient estimates on the trend variables in
Table 8 to interpret changes before and after the break points is straightfor-
ward. But it is not so easy to see what happens with the coefficient estimates
of intercepts. The intercept estimates are single-season values for the first sea-
son in the sample, 1888, but not when a season occurs during a break point.
So we turn to charts of the fitted values of the dependent variables for each
of our competitive balance time series measures in Figures 1–3.
The charts help to visualize the Early Period (1888 to the early 1900s), Pre-
War Period (mid-1900s to later 1930s), Post-War Period (mid-1940s to the
mid-1990s), and Modern Period (after the mid-1990s). Interestingly, compared
with World War II, we find no break point for World War I. The confidence
intervals in Table 7 show the Early Period ending at its earliest around 1899
Table 7
Break point confidence interval summary, 99% critical level (2-point-for-a-win versions only)
Year RSD CR3U CR3L CR4U CR4L
1901 1899–1904 1899–1905
1906 1904–1909 1904–1908
1937 1935–1951
1995/97 1991–1996 1994–1996 1994–1998
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Top-3 teams (break points: 1906, 1995)
Top-4 teams (break points:  1906, 1997) 
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Figure 2. Fitted Koning’s ratio, top teams.
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Figure 1. Fitted Scully–Noll ratio (break points: 1937, 1995).
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and at its latest around 1909, well before the beginning of the ‘war to end all
wars’ in 1914.
Figures 1–3 all show the beginning of the Early Period marked by improved
balance in the EPL. However, Koning’s ratio does an abrupt about-face during
this period (and a shift to less balance for the bottom-team versions in Figure 3)
that is missed by the Scully–Noll ratio. The Scully–Noll ratio doesn’t detect the
abrupt turnaround, plus a decided shift to less balance, until the Post-War Per-
iod. All fitted values in Figures 1–3 show the continued decline in balance to the
Modern Period. Finally, the Scully–Noll ratio and Koning’s ratio for the top
teams detect a decided shift followed by a truly notable increase in the rate of
decline in balance. By Koning’s ratio for the top three or four teams, the annual
rate of decline is just under 2% per year over the Modern Period, and almost
19% from beginning to end. Koning’s ratio for the lower teams shows only a
continued steady decline in balance in the EPL.
Bottom-3 teams (break point: 1901) 
Bottom-4 teams (break point: 1901) 
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Figure 3. Fitted Koning’s ratio, bottom teams.
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IV EPL HISTORY
As stated in the introduction, break point analysis also generates insight
through association to historical events. (We are indebted to Stefan Szymanski
for sharing his historical knowledge on the Early Period, income variation of
clubs, the role of the maximum wage, and the modern sources of revenue
inequality.) There is a steady increase in competitive balance through the
Early Period, and possibly quite dramatically so by Koning’s ratio. A two-
fold explanation follows both changes in the game and its economic under-
pinnings. On the former, the number of goals scored began declining at the
start of the league (Groot, 2008). This makes the increasing balance charac-
terizing the Early Period consistent with the general diffusion of improved
tactics (Palacios-Huerta, 2004). On the latter economic underpinnings, associ-
ated quite close to the 1901 break point, all teams charged the same admis-
sion price from 1890 on. In addition, a maximum wage was fixed. Limiting
revenues and fixing costs could also contribute to the rise in balance early
on. Further, there is a significant expansion of professional football, from
two divisions to four after World War I. At the same time, variation in team
revenues was small. It also is interesting that there is no break point associ-
ated with World War I, the ‘war to end all wars’, like there is for World
War II.
It seems pretty clear that the wide confidence interval around the 1937
break point is associated with World War II, a result common to many time
series. However, an explanation of why balance improved over the entire Pre-
War Period but then reversed its path so clearly after the war eludes us.
Although the abolition of the maximum wage in 1960 allowed the larger reve-
nue clubs the chance to flex their muscles in the talent market, quite possibly
contributing to a decline in competitive balance, this change is quite removed
in time from the break point identifying the Post-War Period. And so we
observe our first suggestion for future research.
We associate this mid-1990s break point with (1) alterations in the format
of the Champions League, (2) growing revenue inequality, and (3) the Euro-
pean Court of Justice’s Bosman Ruling in 1995 (Groot, 2008, also noted the
first and last). Further, the Bosman Ruling may well have influenced the
Champions League in important ways (noted shortly).
On alterations in the Champions League, there were earlier tournaments
consisting of national champions, for example, the Coupe de Nations in 1930.
But the competition of European champions known as the European Cham-
pion Clubs’ Cup formally began in 1955 just after the first congress of the
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). It became the UEFA
Champions League in 1992. The champion earns the European Cup. Table 9
shows that, with the name change, there also have been substantial alterations
in format, especially in the 1990s. With these changes, and the increase in
value of broadcast rights for the Champions League, it is reasonable that an
additional focus on the top teams may have been behind our break in the
mid-1990s that identifies the Modern Period.
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In addition, growing revenue inequality cannot be ignored. Accelerating
revenue inequality followed from three sources in the early 1990s. First, the
TV money gives an edge to the more successful teams since income is not
shared equally. Second, larger revenue teams enjoyed the development of mer-
chandising revenue to a much larger extent than did smaller revenue teams.
Finally, larger revenue teams generated more overseas income.
As for the Bosman Ruling, around this time, European national leagues
confronted important changes in the player transfer system brought about by
this ruling. The ruling was made in a consolidation of three separate legal
cases, all involving Belgian player Jean-marc Bosman – Union royale belge des
societies de football association ASBL vs. Jean-Marc Bosman (Case C-415/93,
ECR I-4921); Royal club liegeois SA vs. Jean-Marc Bosman and others; and
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) vs. Jean-Marc Bosman. The
eventual decision concerned free movement of labor covered by the treaty
establishing the European Community. Essentially, out-of-contract players
could move between national teams without any payment of transfer fees.
This is quite similar to the original free agency outcome in North American
sports leagues decades earlier. Players still under contract required payment of
that fee by receiving clubs.
Table 9
Champions league format chronology
Period History
1955–1991 Knockout format, one club per country (the league champion) plus the
defending champion
1991–1993 Three knockout qualifying rounds, group phase with two groups, two group
winners meet in final, one club per country (the league champion) plus
the defending champion
1993–1994 Knockout semi-finals added following group phase
1994–1997 One knockout qualifying round, group phase with four groups, group
winners and all runners-up to eight club knockout phase, one club per
country (the league champion) plus the defending champion
1997–1999 Two knockout qualifying rounds, group phase with six groups, group
winners and two runners-up to eight club knockout phase, up to two clubs
per country
1999–2003 Three knockout qualifying rounds, two group phases with eight first-phase
group winners and all runners-up moving to four second-phase groups,
second-phase group winners and all runners-up to eight club knockout
phase, up to four clubs per country
Since 2003 Three knockout qualifying rounds, one group phase with eight groups,
group winners and all runners-up to 16 club knockout phase, still up
to four clubs per country
Notes: 1955: Many countries were represented by a team not the domestic champion. 1956–1959: The
domestic runner-up was allowed to compete where the domestic champion was also European champion.
Prior to 1970, aggregate draws were settled by a play-off and (if necessary) coin-toss. Since then, it has
been via the away goals rule and (if necessary) a penalty shootout. The final retained the potential for a
replay until the late 1970s.
Source: Wikipedia.com (2009).
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The case had a profound effect on the transfers of football players within
the European Union (EU), banning restrictions on the movement of foreign
EU members within the national leagues. This ban also allowed professional
football players in the EU to move freely to another club at the end of their
term of contract with their present team. As a result of this enhanced ability
to move between teams, EU players move at the end of their contracts. In
addition, many players born outside of the EU take advantage of EU natural-
ization, obtain a member-country passport, and enhance their employability
with teams across Europe.
While it was best known for allowing out-of-contract players to move to
other clubs without a transfer fee, there also is a direct relationship with the
Champions League. Players from EU member states (including naturalized
members) were not counted as foreigners on any given EU club. A continued
push to move talent to those national leagues where eventual competition at
the European Cup level was most likely may also be a contributing factor
attributable to the Bosman Ruling.
The foregoing has the following research implications. First, analysts should
adhere to break points in subsequent analysis of cross-section or pooled
regression analysis or run the risk of spurious outcomes. Second, Early Period
analysis of the diffusion of tactics and the impacts of the first economic struc-
tures is warranted. Third, we are left wanting on why there is no World War
I break and any reasoning behind just why it is that balance should decline
after World War II. Fourth, an episode analysis of the end of the maximum
wage could prove enlightening for the Post-War Period.
Finally, the Bosman Ruling established a degree of mobility similar to that
which occurred with free agency in North American leagues. Rottenberg’s
(1956) invariance principle would suggest that competitive balance would
remain the same before and after the Bosman Ruling. The only difference
would be that the value created by players would be reallocated from owners
to players. Our evidence from Koning’s ratio is contrary to the predictions of
the invariance principle for the EPL. But remembering the setting for Rotten-
berg’s invariance principle suggests the following line of inquiry.
First, can the rejection of the invariance principle be explained by the exis-
tence of transactions costs prior to the decision that continued on after the
decision (Daly and Moore, 1981)? With significant transactions costs, players
would not be so free to move as the invariance principle requires. Second,
were there barriers to player movement erected after the Bosman Ruling that
would undo the invariance principle prediction? North American leagues defi-
nitely responded to the initial institution of free agency with mechanisms
designed to ameliorate its consequences (Plan A and B in Major League Base-
ball, the Rozelle Rule in the National Football League). National associations
and international federations may have responded to the Bosman Ruling in
predictable ways to try to reduce the reallocation of values away from clubs
and associations to players. From this perspective, the dramatic increase in
imbalance since the Bosman Ruling may have more to do with how European
leagues responded, and the impacts of those responses, than with the ruling
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itself. Sorting this out will also be complicated by the added interaction with
the evolution of the Champions League.
V CONCLUSIONS
We find two different ratio measures of competitive balance in the English Pre-
mier League, 1888–1907, are stationary. Using methods suggested by Bai and
Perron, break points are detected in competitive balance over this history. It
matters which measures are used – the two ratio measurements detect some dif-
ferent break points. Taking the accumulation of information across these two
ratio measures, it appears there are four distinct competitive balance episodes –
The Early, Pre-World War II, Post-World War II, and Modern Periods.
Knowing this is interesting enough, especially for those interested in cross-
section analysis of the data. First, league actions may have improved balance
enough that our technique misses their impacts. This is a place where cross-
section analysis can complement our findings. Second, ours is not an assess-
ment of the impacts of balance on fan demand and the interesting episodes
identified here suggest just such an analysis. But we are an aid by identifying
the stationary periods for balance where level-data studies will not be prone
to spurious correlation problems.
For policy, our results are of some, but limited, help. We have found that,
in the aggregate, arguments for policy intervention based on the idea that
competitive balance has worsened in the EPL of late are well-founded. Further
work is needed to determine the causes of this behavior of competitive balance
during the Modern Period. One possible outcome may well be that Rottenberg’s
invariance principle does not hold for the English Premier League and all of the
fears voiced about free agency in an international association context were on
target. But we urge caution. Is it a failure of Rottenberg’s logic (a logic that has
fared quite well, as a matter of fact, under time series analysis of competitive
balance in North American leagues) or is it that European clubs and national
and international federations responded to the ruling in a way that Rottenberg’s
invariance principle does not address? Only future work can answer this ques-
tion. In any event, competitive balance in the English Premier League has
declined at a record rate for the last decade.
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